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According to the “welfare magnet” hypothesis, migrants with a high likelihood of claiming 
benefits cluster in the most generous welfare systems. After the introduction of the freedom of 
movement for Eastern European workers, EU-15 countries can thus be expected to reduce 
public benefits in order to avoid becoming “welfare magnets”. However, OECD data on 
benefits do not support the prediction of a race to the bottom in protection levels. Using data 
from the EU-LFS 2004 to 2011, I analyze the determinants of migration flows and find that, 
in contrast to theory, welfare state variables do not significantly affect migration flows when 
controlling for temporary political restrictions of the freedom of movement (2+3+2 rule). 
This explains why the pressure to modify national welfare spending is small. Furthermore, 
evidence is found that the restrictions completely offset the incentive effects of work-related 
pull factors and thereby hamper an efficient allocation of labor across national borders. 
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In December 2002, the European Council voted in favor of enlarging the EU by an additional 
10 countries. The decision was approved by the EU parliament in April 2003. On the 1st of 
May 2004, these 10 countries, mainly situated in Eastern Europe (EU-10)1, joined the Union. 
On the 1st of January 2007, Bulgaria and Romania (EU-2) followed. Together, this round of 
enlargement increased the size of the EU population from approximately 400 million to 500 
million citizens (Eurostat, 2013). A central institutional change connected to the acceptance of 
the new member states in the European “club” was the introduction of the freedom of 
movement for workers. According to this legislation, every citizen in the EU can start 
working in another EU country without the need for a work permit. For potential migrant 
workers, this regulation significantly reduces the cost of moving abroad.  
Within a common labor market, the size and composition of migration flows are not 
determined by the decisions of local immigration officers, but by the aggregate of individual 
migration decisions in the source regions. Thus, national governments partly delegate their 
sovereignty of determining the size and composition of the population to millions of potential 
migrant workers who can freely decide where to settle. Since the standard of living in the new 
member states was well below the average level in the old EU-15 member states2 at the time 
the legislation was brought into force, the accession initiated a debate about the sustainability 
of the welfare state. 
Sinn (2002) warned that the introduction of the freedom of movement for workers in 
combination with access to public benefits in the EU-15 would result in an erosion of 
protection levels. According to his reasoning, national governments could be expected to 
avoid inflows of migrants claiming welfare by reducing the generosity of benefits. A race to 
the bottom dynamic in the EU-15 could thus cause an erosive process. Kvist (2004) drew less 
drastic conclusions by arguing that the effects of “welfare migration” are too small to directly 
affect the decision making process on the national level. However, he also considered that 
governments in the EU-15 might engage in strategic interactions with respect to decisions on 
national social policies. 
Certainly also as a result of these political controversies, the so-called 2+3+2 rule found its 
way into the accession treaties. This rule concedes EU member states the right to postpone the 
realization of the freedom of movement for workers for up to 7 years after the accession. It 
applies to workers from the EU-83 and the EU-2 member states. With respect to workers from 
the EU-8, only Ireland, Sweden and the UK lifted restrictions immediately in May 2004. In 
contrast, Austria and Germany kept restricting the freedom of movement until the end of the 
                                                 
1  EU-10: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.  
2  EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 






2+3+2 phase in May 2011. In January 2007, Finland and Sweden lifted restrictions for 
workers from the EU-2 while the other EU-15 countries kept their labor markets closed. In 
Spain, restrictions for workers from the EU-2 were lifted in January 2009 and partly 
reintroduced in July 2011. This exceptional step was justified by the extraordinarily difficult 
situation on the labor market and was not applied in any other EU-15 country. In summary, 
the option of applying the 2+3+2 rule led to a very asymmetric opening of the labor markets 
in the EU-15 towards the East. 
Ultimately, national decision makers in EU-15 countries were endowed with two policy 
instruments to potentially influence the inflow of workers: the generosity of the welfare state 
and the postponement of the labor market opening through the 2+3+2 rule. The main goal of 
this study is to analyze how these political decisions influence the migration flows to the EU-
15. How relevant is the “welfare magnet” effect in the EU-15? How did the “welfare magnet” 
effect interact with the application of the 2+3+2 rule? Did a race to the bottom in the 
generosity of welfare states take place? 
In a first step, I present the strategic instruments of the national policy makers in a stylized 
way. I illustrate the development of the welfare state in the different EU member states in the 
aftermath of the 2002 decision in Copenhagen. Several indicators characterizing welfare state 
generosity like the ratio of social expenditures to the GDP level, the social expenditures per 
capita and the net replacement rate that defines the out-of-work benefit level are described. In 
addition, the asymmetric application of the 2+3+2 rule in the different countries is discussed. 
Secondly, an analysis of the effects of the policies in the EU-15 member states on the 
immigration flows is pursued. Using micro data from the EU Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS), I 
estimate the effects of a rich set of determinants that influence the individual migration 
decision and thus the migrant inflow to a destination country in the EU-15. The use of micro 
data allows for the inclusion of socio-economic characteristics as controls in the analysis. 
A special focus is put on the “welfare magnet” effect since the significance and strength of 
this effect determines the magnitude of clustering in generous welfare states. The stronger the 
effect is the more intense should be the interaction of national governments in reducing social 
expenditures. As micro data from the EU-LFS are used, some light is shed on the effect of the 
composition of the diaspora and the source population on the migration flows. Information on 
socio-economic characteristics of the surveyed is included in the regressions which allows for 
a deeper analysis of the network relationship of the sending and receiving country. 
The temporary restrictions on the freedom of movement are modeled as a migration regime 
that influences the marginal effects of the push and pull factor dynamics in the EU. Hence, the 
2+3+2 rule is considered as covariate in the regression. Furthermore, interaction terms with 
push and pull factors are constructed in order to control for the effect of restricted labor 
market access on the marginal effects of the determinants. In the empirical strategy, I thereby 






empirical economists produce seriously flawed results by neglecting the effects of 
institutionally restricted labor mobility. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the literature on “welfare 
migration” and the effects of networks and institutional restrictions on individual migration 
decisions. In Section 3, I present some stylized facts about the potential race to the bottom 
dynamics in the EU-15 after the enlargement decision of Copenhagen in 2002. The 
development of the welfare state generosity and the asymmetric application of the restrictions 
on the freedom of movement are shown and discussed as strategic instruments of national 
policy makers. Section 4 presents the data and a descriptive analysis of migration flows from 
the EU-10 and EU-2 member states. Section 5 is devoted to the empirical analysis of the 
determinants of migration flows using the EU-LFS and to the discussion of the major 
findings. Furthermore, I present results from a sensitivity analysis which includes alternative 
concepts of welfare state generosity and a comparison of the results with the previous 
findings. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Literature review: “Welfare magnets” and the individual migration decision 
 
The direction, size and composition of international migration flows are functions of the 
aggregate of millions of individual migration and remigration decisions. In turn, these 
decisions are determined by a rich variety of country- and individual-specific factors.4 
Zimmermann (1995) describes these individual choices as best answers to a complex system 
of push and pull factors. Pull factors are defined as determinants of a country that “pull” 
migrant flows into this specific destination, while push factors are conditions that describe the 
situation in the source countries potentially “pushing” people to emigrate. The push and pull 
factors span a net of migration incentives that determines the allocation of mobile labor across 
borders. Since the size and composition of migration inflows matter for the economic 
outcomes in the destination country, policy makers have a natural interest in the determinants 
of these decisions and the international structure of migration incentives. 
Initially, the discussion of welfare state generosity as a pull factor goes back to the Roy model 
(Roy, 1951) that is applied to the case of migration decisions by Borjas (1994). It is usually 
referred to the Roy-Borjas model in the literature.5 The central result of the model is that the 
self-selection of immigrants depends on wage dispersion in the source and destination 
country. Under the assumption that the skill rewards in both, destination and source country, 
are highly correlated, immigrants are positively selected if wage dispersion is higher in the 
destination than in the source country and negatively selected in the opposite case. According 
to this theory, immigrants, for example, from source countries in Eastern Europe in EU-15 
                                                 
4  See Mayda (2010) and Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008) for an overview. 






destination countries should be negatively selected as Western European welfare states are 
usually characterized by a smaller degree of wage dispersion than Eastern European 
economies. 
Based on the implications of the theoretical model, Borjas (1999) develops the “welfare 
magnet” hypothesis. It consists of two parts: (1) states with high levels of social security 
attract more migrants in general (better insurance of unemployment risks as a pull factor) and 
(2) immigrant flows to these states are characterized by an over-proportionately high share of 
low-skilled migrants (negative selection). The first part addresses the issue of selection across 
alternative destinations while the second addresses the selection within the immigration flows. 
Borjas (1999) tests whether the hypothesis is supported by data on the patterns of immigration 
to US states. He finds empirical evidence that, relative to natives, benefit receiving 
immigrants to the US cluster in states where benefit levels are high. The native-immigrant gap 
is explained by the differences in migration costs. For immigrants, migration costs arise when 
they move to the US while the choice of a particular state does not result in additional costs. 
For natives, the move to another state induces costs which prevent them choosing the state 
with the highest benefit level.  
However, several economists have challenged these findings. Kaushal (2005) does not find 
evidence that immigrants cluster in US states that are characterized by a high level of benefits. 
She shows that access to TANF, Medicaid and food stamps (means-tested programs) does not 
or only weakly change the location choice of low-skilled unmarried immigrant women. Since 
this is the group that is most likely to be dependent on welfare systems, she concludes that the 
“welfare magnet” hypothesis can be rejected. In her study, restrictions to welfare access are 
considered which is not done in previous analysis. Other authors argue that clustering of 
migrants is more likely caused by migrant network effects than by the welfare levels. Beine et 
al. (2011) use data of bilateral migration flows from 195 source to 30 OECD destination 
countries and find that the size of diasporas in destination countries have a positive effect on 
immigrant inflows and an adverse effect on the education level of the immigrants. In contrast, 
the benefit level does not appear to have a significant effect on the location choice across the 
countries.  
Pedersen et al. (2008) analyze flows from 126 countries to 26 OECD destination countries. 
Their results are in line with the findings of Beine et al. (2011). While Beine et al. (2011) 
have information on the education level6 of the surveyed and thus are able to directly test the 
effect of the welfare level on the skill composition of the flows, Pedersen et al. (2008) proxy 
the skill level by the GDP of the source country. The latter study finds weak evidence for a U-
shaped relationship between the welfare level in the destination and the GDP per capita in the 
source. Migrants of relatively poor or of relatively rich countries in terms of GDP per capita 
                                                 
6  They use the database by Docquier et al. (2007) which provides information on immigrant stocks in OECD 






are most attracted to destination countries with high benefit levels. The authors further 
conclude that a restrictive migration policy often prevents the adverse selection of migrants. 
Empirical studies with a cross-country focus on Europe are relatively scarce. De Giorgi and 
Pellizzari (2009) analyze panel data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) 
and find a significant effect of the net replacement income7 in the destination country on 
migration decisions. However, the effect is small compared to the incentive from a higher 
annual compensation of employees. In their study, a higher compensation has a 10 times 
larger effect on the likelihood of migrating to a destination than an increase in the net 
replacement income. Brücker et al. (2002) finds support for the thesis that welfare generosity 
implies negative sorting of migrants in Europe. The study shows that high-skilled migrants 
prefer countries with low benefits and taxes, while the low-skilled cluster in countries with a 
high benefit level. 
However, since the EU-15 countries are conceded the right to temporarily restrict the freedom 
of movement it is difficult to clearly disentangle the “welfare magnet” effect from other 
institutional factors influencing migration flows. In a recent paper, Razin and Wahba (2011) 
provide an explanation why most empirical studies do not find evidence for the “welfare 
magnet” hypothesis. Introducing different migration regimes, they show why “welfare 
migration” should only prevail in common labor markets without mobility restrictions. It is 
argued that, for example, in the common EU labor market with free movement for workers 
the benefit level should act as a pull factor, while this need not be the case for countries with a 
migration regime that restricts the entry or the access to welfare for migrants. In their model, 
the effect of the welfare system on migration decisions is interacted with the migration regime 
in place. Consequently, Razin and Wahba (2011) point out that empirical analysis should 
carefully consider the differential effects of migration regimes on the validity of the “welfare 
migration” hypothesis. 
To summarize the current state of research, two determinants besides the differences in the 
skill rewards should be named that “compete” for being the more important explanatory 
variable for migrant clustering: the network effect and the “welfare magnet”. While some 
studies emphasize the clustering effect through networks (Beine et al., 2011; Kaushal, 2005; 
Pedersen et al., 2008), other authors point out the importance of the welfare level (Borjas, 
1999; Brücker et al., 2002; De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009). However, these studies only 
partially control for the differential effect of migration regimes that might reduce or 
completely eliminate the marginal effects of the push and pull factors. Especially in the case 
of “welfare migration”, this point should be stressed as many regimes explicitly restrict access 
                                                 
7 The net replacement income is defined as the income that the government pays to an unemployed after the 
job loss. It is calculated as the product of the net replacement rate (NRR) and the regular income of the 






to the welfare state. A further weakness of most studies8 is the use of bilateral macro flow 
data that do not allow for the analysis of the composition of the diaspora and the population in 
the source region. Migrant stocks are treated as black boxes so that incentives due to socio-
economic characteristics are to be ignored in the analysis. 
 
3. Strategic interaction in the EU-15: Is there evidence for a race to the bottom? 
 
According to the non-discrimination principle in the European treaties, every EU citizen can 
claim benefits in another EU member state after a short period of employment. Authors like 
Sinn (2002) and Kvist (2004) have thus warned that the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 
might lead to a race to the bottom in welfare state protection.9 In a common EU labor market, 
a reform of national welfare institutions does not only affect the economic outcomes via the 
local labor market but may also affect the migration incentives for potential workers from 
other EU countries as the attractiveness of a destination country changes ceteris paribus. A 
policy maker who wants to maximize the utility of a country or its electorate in the EU-15 
therefore considers the effects of a parameter change on the individual migration likelihood of 
workers in the EU-10 or EU-2 countries.  
Razin and Wahba (2011) emphasize that governments can reduce the pressure from potential 
“welfare migration” by introducing restrictions on labor mobility. In the case of the EU 
enlargements in 2004 and 2007, these restrictions are defined under the 2+3+2 rule. The 
relevance of the pull effect of the welfare state generosity in an EU-15 member state thus 
depends on the level of the public benefits and the application of the 2+3+2 rule. Both 
decisions at the national level potentially create policy externalities on other member states as 
migration flows to other destinations and their skill composition might be diverted as a result. 
But is there evidence for a race to the bottom after the decision in Copenhagen in 2002? Has 
the EU enlargement initiated strategic behavior between the different EU-15 countries?  
Figure 1 below shows the development of the ratio of public social expenditures relative to 
the GDP level in the EU-15 member states after 2002. The year 2002 is chosen as a starting 
point since the decision to enlarge the EU took place in that year. Hence, potential 
adjustments of welfare states directly after the final enlargement decision are considered in 
the analysis. The measurement is normalized to 1 in each country for the reference year 2004.  
 
                                                 
8  To my knowledge, only De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) use micro data from the ECHP, while all other 
studies focusing on Europe are based on macro data from central registers or national census and treat the 
composition of the population in terms of socio-economic characteristics as a black box. 
9  Sinn (2002) argues in favor of the home country principle with respect to benefit claims. He prefers an 
opening of the labor markets under the condition that benefits are provided by the home countries of the 
migrants. This would allow reaping the benefits of labor mobility without the disadvantages of efficiency-
distorting “welfare migration”. By the combination of the freedom of movement for workers and the 
restricted access to benefits in the destination countries, migrants are expected to move in order to maximize 






Figure 1: Ratio of public social expenditures to GDP in the EU-15 countries, 2002 - 2012 




Source:  OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). 
 
The numbers are based on detailed OECD data for 2002 to 2009 and projections of the 
aggregated spending for the years 2010 to 2012. Cash benefits and benefits in kind are 
included. Data are collected from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX).10 For the 
countries in the South (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), an upward trend in the relative 
importance of the social expenditures can be observed until 2009. From the year 2009 
onwards, the ratios stay relatively constant despite the abolishment of restrictions towards 
workers from the EU-2 in Greece, Portugal and Spain. The ratios of Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands also show an upward trend during the portrayed period. In Luxemburg, the ratio 
declined from 2004 to 2007, but then returned back to the level of 2004 although the labor 
market restrictions for workers from the EU-8 were lifted in 2007. 
                                                 
10  Giulietti and Wahba (2012) give a detailed description of the composition of social expenditures in OECD 
countries based on the SOCX database. They also compare the level of the net replacement rates and the 
ratios of social expenditures to GDP and conclude that the measurements significantly differ across countries. 
The difference is explained by nationally diverting demographic patterns that influence the relevance of 





































































































































Denmark, Finland and Sweden are characterized by weak declines in the relative expenditures 
until 2007. However, in Denmark and Finland, these declines are more than offset by 
increases in the measurement from 2007 to 2012. Only in Sweden, the ratio in 2012 stays 
below the value of 2004. For Austria and Germany, the development shows a stable pattern 
over time, the levels in 2012 are close to the levels reported in 2004. The numbers for Ireland 
and the UK indicate a tremendous increase. In Ireland, the ratio in 2012 is about 40% larger 
than in 2004. For the UK, an increase of about 20 % is reported. Despite the opening of the 
borders for the workers from the EU-8 in 2004, no evidence for a relative decline in public 
social expenditures can be found in the two countries. In fact, data on public social 
expenditures per capita in purchasing power do also not support the race to the bottom 
hypothesis. In Figure 1A of the appendix, the development of the purchasing power adjusted 
expenditures per capita is illustrated. It shows that in all EU-15 countries the expenditures per 
capita increased during the period from 2004 to 2009.  
One might argue that relative or per capita measurements cannot account for increases in the 
number of recipients, for example, in the case of increasing unemployment rates. Obviously, 
numbers on the expenditures per recipient would be the most accurate measurement of the 
welfare state generosity. Unfortunately, data that are internationally comparable are not 
available. However, the OECD Benefits and Wages database provides internationally 
comparable information on the net replacement rate (NRR). This rate measures the ratio of the 
replacement income in the case of unemployment relative to the average income of the 
worker before unemployment. Figure 2 below depicts the development of the net replacement 
rate which is constructed as an unweighted average based on 4 family types (single person 
without children, one-earner married couples without children, lone parent with 2 children 
and one-earner married couple with 2 children) and 2 income levels (67% and 100% of the 
average wage). The rate is calculated as an average over a five year period following 
unemployment. Again, the measurement is normalized to 1 in 2004 for each EU-15 country. 
Here, the picture is less clear than in the case of the ratio of social expenditures to GDP. In 
Portugal and Spain, the net replacement rate stays relatively constant over time. In Greece, the 
rate strongly oscillates around the value of 2004. Italy represents an exceptional case as 
considerable modifications of the rate over the short time period of observation can be found 
in the data. The net replacement rate fluctuates between 6% (normalized 1) in 2004 and 11% 
(normalized 1.83) in 2009. In the Benelux countries, the replacement rate weakly increased in 
the observed period, while a small decrease can be discovered for France. In contrast, in the 
Nordic countries, significant decreases in the NRR can be identified. In Denmark and 
Sweden, the rate was reduced by more than 10 % from 2004 to 2010. The Finish replacement 
rate was reduced by about 5 %. In Austria, the replacement rate remained relatively constant, 
while in Germany, it decreased by more than 5 %. For the UK, no clear change can be 






Figure 2: Development of the average net replacement rate over a five year period following 
unemployment, 2002 - 2010 (unweighted average over 4 family types and 2 income 




Source: OECD Benefits and Wages: Statistics, Benefit generosity.  
Note: Italy is only depicted until 2004 as the ratio of the country shows much larger fluctuations 
over time than the other countries. The NRR in Italy increased from 6% (normalized 1) in 
2004 to 11% (normalized 1.83) in 2009 and 9% (normalized 1.5) in 2010. Therefore, the 
development of the rate is not completely covered in the graphic. 
 
Besides the decision on the design of the welfare state, an EU-15 country had a second policy 
instrument for strategic interaction: the 2+3+2 rule. In Table 1 below, the application of the 
rule is presented. Three countries opened the labor market for workers from the EU-8 from 
May 2004 onwards: Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Two years later, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain followed. Belgium, France, Luxemburg and the Netherlands lifted 
restrictions between 2006 and 2008, while Austria and Germany restricted the freedom of 
movement until the end of the 2+3+2 period in May 2011. In the case of the workers from 
the EU-2, most EU-15 countries kept restrictions until 2012 or later. Only Finland and 
Sweden established the freedom of movement for the EU-2 in 2007. Denmark, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain implemented the EU legislation in 2009. Though, Spain partly 

































Table 1: Application of the 2+3+2 rule: year when freedom of movement for workers from the 
EU-8 and EU-2 is realized in the EU-15 countries 
 
Country EU-8 EU-2 
Austria 2011 Restrictions 
Belgium 2009 Restrictions 
Denmark 2009 2009 
Finland 2006 2007 
France 2008 Restrictions 
Germany 2011 Restrictions 
Greece 2006 2009 
Ireland 2004 2012 
Italy 2006 2012 
Luxemburg 2007 Restrictions 
Netherlands 2007 Restrictions 
Portugal 2006 2009 
Spain 2006 2009 / restrict. reintroduced in 2011 
Sweden 2004 2007 
United Kingdom 2004 Restrictions 
 
Source:  EU Commission (DG Employment), Holland et al. (2011). 
Note: Restrictions means that in the third phase of the transitional periods (1st January 2012 to 
31st of December 2013), the freedom of movement is not fully realized yet. 
 
The findings of the descriptive analysis above show that there is no clear evidence for a race 
to the bottom after the decision on EU accession in 2002. Social expenditures relative to GDP 
rather show an increasing trend until 2012 which might be explained by increasing 
unemployment rates that outweigh the effects of EU enlargement. This finding is supported 
by Gaston and Rujaguru (2013) who report a positive relationship between the ratio of social 
expenditures to GDP and the change in immigration relative to the native population. The 
development of the net replacement rate that determines the out-of-work benefits of an 
unemployed person also does not support the hypothesis of an erosion of welfare state 
protection driven by EU enlargement. 
However, a central question remains unanswered: did the restrictions on the freedom of 
movement eliminate the pressure to reduce welfare levels or was the “welfare magnet” effect 
too weak to significantly influence policy making on the national level? This question is 
addressed in the following sections which are dedicated to the empirical analysis of the 
determinants of migration flows and their interaction with the migration regime in place. 
 
4. Data and descriptives: Estimating migrant stocks and flows with the EU-LFS 
 
4.1. The dataset 
 
With the European Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS), Eurostat provides data from the national 
micro census surveys for all 27 EU member states containing information on demographic 






questionnaire, the data are comparable and can be used for cross country comparisons. In 
spite of the comparability across countries, the EU-LFS dataset and household survey data in 
general are still seldomly used for the estimation of international migration flows (Rendall, 
Tomassini and Elliot, 2003). It is argued that the estimates are often imprecise due to several 
problems regarding the representation of migrants in survey data.11 Rendall, Tomassini and 
Elliot (2003) use the EU-LFS information on the place of residence of the surveyed one year 
before the interview and compare the estimated migration flows from the continental EU to 
the UK and vice versa. The authors come to the conclusion that, on average, the LFS 
underestimates the size of the migration flows by around 15 to 25 per cent compared to data 
from the UK’s port survey, the International Passenger Survey and the UK censuses. 
Martí and Ródenas (2007) confirm these results. In their study, a comparison of official 
register and census statistics with the estimations based on the EU-LFS is conducted. The 
annual migration flows that are calculated based on the EU-LFS information on the place of 
residence one year before the survey strongly divert from the official national statistics.12 
However, with respect to migrant stock estimates based on the self-reported nationality, Martí 
and Ródenas (2007) report that the EU-LFS numbers coincide with the official statistics from 
immigration registers or censuses in most EU-15 countries. Only for Greece and Spain do 
numbers show significant divergences.13 Other examples for studies on immigration based on 
information from the LFS are Blanchflower and Shadforth (2009), Drinkwater et al. (2009), 
Dustmann et al. (2009) and Gilpin et al. (2006). After the discussion of the weaknesses of the 
data, Dustmann et al. (2009) who use the UK LFS emphasize that “despite these limitations, 
the LFS remains the best available source of data on immigrant stocks […]” (p. 7). Relying on 
data from the same source, Longhi and Rokicka (2012) expect the survey to offer a precise 
picture of the immigrants that live in the UK including the self-employed. 
To my knowledge, there is no analysis of determinants of migration flows across EU 
countries based on EU-LFS data. Beine et al. (2011) take cross section data on two years 
(1990 and 2000) from the Docquier and Marfouk (2007) database. Changes affecting 
migration incentives and flows in the 10-year-period between 1990 and 2000 cannot be 
                                                 
11  Maybe the most important reason for the rare use is the problem of small sample sizes which is not an issue 
when using administrative data. Migrants from a specific source country usually constitute a small group 
relative to native households in most EU countries and thus are only represented in small numbers in samples 
of household surveys. In addition, Gilpin et al. (2006) and Drinkwater et al. (2009) emphasize that migrants 
might be underrepresented in surveys as they less likely live at private addresses. Johnson et al. (2002) add 
that migrants tend to refuse to answer survey questionnaires more often than natives. 
12  The annual flow variable is constructed based on the EU-LFS question on the country of residence one year 
before the survey interview. The information on this variable provided by Eurostat is characterized by many 
missing values so that the variable does not seem to be suitable to estimate actual annual gross inflows of 
migrants. 
13  For the year 2001, the estimations for the non-national population stock in Greece based on the EU-LFS is 
45.38 percent of the number that is reported by the Greek census data. For Spain, the estimation from the EU-
LFS is about 43.62 percent of the number reported by the Spanish population register in 2001. For the other 
EU-15 countries, numbers range from 71.39 percent (Portugal) to about 100.29 percent for Luxemburg which 






considered. Pedersen et al. (2008) also use data from 1990 and 2000 from statistical offices of 
26 OECD countries. Consequently, the same problem as in Beine et al. (2011) applies. De 
Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) use micro data from the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP). The authors can thus control for the effects of the socio-economic background of the 
immigrants. However, the study suffers from possible imprecision due to small sample sizes 
as the samples of the ECHP are considerably smaller than samples of the micro census. The 
reasons why I use EU-LFS data are the availability of socio-economic information and the 
large number of observations. Only with micro data, it is possible to shade light on the black 
box of socio-economic backgrounds and to draw a more detailed picture of the interaction 
between the diaspora network and the population in the source region. 
 
4.2. Migrant stocks in EU-15 countries after 2004 
 
In this study, information on self-reported nationality in the EU-LFS dataset is used to 
measure the immigrant stock in an EU-15 destination country.14 This procedure has two 
advantages over the alternative country of birth principle: 1) nationality defines an 
immigrant’s status in official statistics of most EU member states and 2) the institutional 
restrictions on the freedom of movement (2+3+2 rule) which are applied on the basis of the 
worker’s nationality can be considered in the empirical analysis. Unfortunately, information 
on the origin of the surveyed are highly aggregated in the scientific use files. For the years 
2004 to 2011, the self-reported EU nationalities are subsumed in three country groups: EU-15, 
EU-10 and EU-2. Since, before 2004, data on nationality are even less precise15, the analysis 
exclusively relies on EU-LFS data from 2004 to 2011. Denmark, Finland and Sweden group 
EU-10 and EU-2 nationalities under the single category EU-12. As this does not allow for the 
consideration of differential effects through the 2+3+2 rule, these countries are excluded 
from the analysis.16 In Figure 3 below, the development of the EU-10 migrant stocks in the 
EU-15 countries is presented. It shows that the increases were modest in most countries. 
Nonetheless, some countries experienced larger inflows than expected before accession.17
                                                 
14 In the economic literature, there is no consensus on the definition of an immigrant. Pedersen et al. (2008) 
report that, in official publications, some countries make use of the country of birth or origin principle and 
define a migrant as a person that is born in another country than the current place of residence (for example, 
Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, the Slovak Republic and the United States). On 
the contrary, countries like Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy and Sweden define 
an immigrant by the citizenship. Belgium, France, Hungary, Germany, Japan, Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom use information on the self-reported nationality. 
15  In the surveys before 2004, it is distinguished between EU-15 and NON-EU-15 nationalities. 
16 Unfortunately, all three countries are characterized by high levels of welfare state protection so that 
excluding them might bias the estimation of the “welfare magnet” effect. However, the number of migrants 
that moved to these destinations after 2004 is relatively small. Hence, the estimated coefficients should 
overestimate the true impact of the public benefits when these countries are excluded. The estimates thus 
represent an upper bound of the effect in reality. 
17  In the run-up to the EU enlargement, great uncertainty about the numbers of workers coming from the 
accession countries to the EU-15 persisted. See Baas and Brücker (2010) for an overview of studies on 






Figure 3: Number of migrants with an EU-10 nationality in the EU-15 countries (2004 - 2011) 
 
 
Source:  EU-LFS (2004-2011), for Germany: Central Register of Foreigners, Federal Office of 
Administration Germany (2004-2011). 
Notes: Denmark, Finland and Sweden are excluded. Ireland only provides data for the years 
2005 and 2008 to 2010. Italy does not deliver data for 2004. The estimate for Belgium in 
2004 is based on 44 obs., for Luxemburg in 2004 on 47 obs. Portugal does not deliver 
data for 2004. The estimates for Portugal from 2005 to 2011 are based on the following 
numbers of obs.: 15/13/34/21/28/38/26. All other estimates are based on more than 50 
observations. EU-LFS population weights are used. 
 
Figure 4: Number of migrants with an EU-2 nationality in the EU-15 countries (2004 - 2011) 
 
 
Source:  EU-LFS (2004-2011), for Germany: Central Register of Foreigners, Federal Office of 
Administration Germany (2004-2011). 
Notes: Denmark, Finland and Sweden are excluded. Ireland only provides EU-LFS data for the 
years 2005 and 2008 to 2010. The estimates for Belgium in 2004 are based on 18 obs. For 
Germany in 2007, the number is calculated with 32 obs., for France in 2004 with 24 obs. 
For Luxemburg in 2004, the number of obs. is 32, in 2007, it is 22, in 2008, it is 12 and in 
2009, it is 41. For the Netherlands, the respective number in 2004 is 21, from 2006 to 
2008, it is 40, 19, 41, for 2011, it is 30. The estimate for Portugal in 2004 is based on 36, 
in the UK in 2004 on 23 and in 2006 on 48 obs. All other estimates are based on more 












































In Germany and the UK, the number of EU-10 nationals increased significantly from 2004 to 
2011. Ireland also experienced large inflows. The stock of migrants from the EU-10 countries 
expanded from about 59,000 persons in 2005 to about 180,000 in 2011. In the other EU-15 
countries, the increases are less pronounced in absolute terms. Figure 4 above illustrates that 
migration from the EU-2 to the EU-15 countries followed a different pattern. The flows were 
concentrated on Italy and Spain. In Italy, the number of EU-2 nationals increased from about 
350,000 persons in 2005 to over 1,000,000 persons in 2011. Spain experienced an increase 
from around 300,000 (2004) to around 870,000 persons (2011). EU-LFS data for the other 
countries report a much smaller increase in the size of the stocks.18 Due to the small size of 
the German EU-LFS samples after 2005, the numbers for Germany in Figure 3 and 4 rely on 
data from the Central Register for Foreigners and are not calculated with LFS data.19  
 
5. Empirical analysis 
 
The aim of the following empirical analysis is to quantify (1) the effect of different levels of 
welfare state protection and (2) the effect of the 2+3+2 rule on the annual migration flows 
into an EU-15 destination country. Besides these two policy instruments of decision makers in 
the destination countries, I control for a rich variety of other economic and non-economic 
determinants that might influence the individual decision making process of potential 
migrants.20 I consider destination country-specific factors like the annual average nominal net 
wage per worker and the size of the diaspora, but also socio-economic characteristics like the 
education levels in the diaspora and the source country population. These factors are treated 
as “endogenous” controls in the model besides the policy variables. 
 
5.1. Constructing age-specific diaspora ratios 
 
As dependent variable for the regression analysis, I define ratios of the total number of 
migrants in an EU-15 country relative to the number of persons in the source country group 
(EU-15, EU-10 and EU-2).21 In the following, I will refer to these ratios as diaspora ratios 
since they represent the proportion of nationals that live in the diaspora relative to the persons 
that did not leave the source country. The micro structure of the dataset allows for a further 
distinction of these ratios with respect to the age of the migrants. I therefore construct three 
age groups: the 15-24 year old, the 25-34 year old and the 35-44 year old persons. Since 
                                                 
18 In the appendix, a further graphic showing the numbers of migrants from other EU-15 countries is presented. 
19 According to Regulation (EC) No 2257/2003, EU countries have the right to provide Eurostat with 
subsamples from the national micro census. Germany makes use of this regulation and provides 10% 
subsamples of the annual census data from the year 2006 onwards. In result, the numbers of individual 
observations of migrants for these years are drastically reduced and do not allow for a reliable estimation of 
the migrant stocks. 
20 For an overview of the factors, see Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008). 






studies show that migrants tend to move in their early life, individuals older than 44 years are 
not considered in the analysis.22 As I consider three source country groups (EU-15, EU-10, 
EU-2) and three age groups, nine cohorts are built per year and destination country. Using 
weights provided by Eurostat, I then calculate the size of these nine diaspora cohorts and the 
size of the respective nine source cohorts. Finally, I build the diaspora ratios as the proportion 
of the size of the diaspora cohort to the size of the source cohort. Theoretically, for each 
destination country, 72 ratios could be constructed for the eight years from 2004 to 2011. In 
fact, the number of ratios considered in the analysis is smaller than 72 per destination since 
some countries do not deliver LFS data for each of the years under observation.23 
 
Table 2:  Number of non-nationals in EU-15 destination countries per 100 persons in the source 
country groups EU-15, EU-10 and EU-2 (%, 2010) 
Cohort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Origin EU-15 EU-15 EU-15 EU-10 EU-10 EU-10 EU-2 EU-2 EU-2 
Age band 15-24 25-34 35-44 15-24 25-34 35-44 15-24 25-34 35-44 
in Austria 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.35 0.20 
in Belgium 0.10 0.15 0.18 (0.04) 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.35 0.20 
in Germany 0.43 0.66 0.77 (0.64) 1.32 1.55 (0.65) (0.97) (1.02) 
in Spain 0.14 0.25 0.33 (0.13) (0.30) (0.32) 3.58 6.40 5.67 
in France 0.16 0.26 0.44 (0.02) 0.20 0.11 0.24 0.66 0.40 
in Greece (0.01) 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.21 0.53 0.46 
in Ireland 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.26 0.79 0.25 0.06 0.14 0.09 
in Italy 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.40 0.31 3.07 7.24 5.43 
in Luxemb. 0.04 0.06 0.06 (0.00) (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
in Netherl. 0.03 0.06 0.08 (0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.04) (0.16) (0.08) 
in Portugal 0.01 0.01 0.01 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 0.10 0.18 0.10 
in the UK 0.28 0.43 0.37 1.51 3.63 1.24 (0.63) 1.49 (0.42) 
in all 12 EU 
countries 1.29 2.06 2.44 2.90 7.20 4.28 8.90 18.49 14.08 
 
Source:  Own calculations based on the EU-LFS 2010. 
Notes: Estimations in brackets are based on less than 50 observations in the numerator 
(estimation of migrant stock). 
 
Table 2 above shows the diaspora ratios for the different destination countries for the year 
2010. In 2010, for example, 6.4 out of 100 or 6.4 % of the 25-34 year old persons with EU-2 




                                                 
22 It is argued that gains from migration are largest for young migrants as this group profits the most from a 
higher remuneration of human capital over the life time. Thus, at a certain age, a move abroad is not 
advantageous anymore as the fixed costs of migration exceed the expected gains from a larger compensation 
of the human capital. 
23 Table 1A in the appendix shows the size of the diasporas in the 12 destination countries for the year 2010. In 
addition, I calculate the population sizes of the cohorts in the source regions in 2010 which are presented in 






5.2. Identification strategy 
 
Two approaches for estimating the determinants of migration flows dominate the literature: 
the dynamic stock model and the static flow model.24 These two approaches differ with 
respect to the modeling of the adjustment to a new steady state after a change in the migration 
environment, for example, through the reduction of migration costs after EU accession. The 
first approach, the dynamic stock model, relies on the assumption that potential migrants are 
heterogeneous. In the case of an opening of the borders, the adjustment process ends in a new 
steady state if the migrant for whom the step to migrate is marginally advantageous moves to 
the destination. Implicitly, the existence of a steady state for the stock is assumed. A change 
in an explanatory variable leads to a new steady state level, which initiates a temporary 
adjustment process with positive net migration flows until the new steady state is found.  
The second approach, the static flow model, depends on the assumption that the potential 
migrants are homogeneous so that a permanent flow of migrants can be observed. As 
dependent variable, the change in the migration stock is used instead of the migrant stock 
itself. A change in an explanatory variable affects the (annual) change rate of the migrant 
stock. Thus, for example, a ceteris paribus increase in the wage level is expected to lead to an 
increase in the annual change rate of the migrant stock. 
I estimate parameters for both model approaches. However, in the case of the dynamic stock 
model, the estimations indicate a dynamically instable model so that I reject the validity of the 
approach.25 Hence, only the results of the static flow model are presented and interpreted in 
the next sections. The model is based on the assumption that migrants choose the destination 
country that maximizes their utility. This utility and thus the decision is determined by many 
different factors, be they destination country-, source country- or individual-specific. In the 
following, j denotes the 12 EU-15 destination countries (j = 1,…,12)26, i the source cohort (i = 
1,…,9) and t the time period (t = 1,…,8, from 2004 to 2011). The identification strategy is 
given by Equation (1) which is estimated by using pooled OLS: 
 
Δ݉௜௝,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵܦ௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܰ௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚସܫ௜௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚ଺ܿ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௝,௧  (1) 
 
                                                 
24  Alvarez-Plata et al. (2003), Boeri et al. (2001), Fertig (2001) and Flaig (2001) apply a dynamic stock model 
while Dustmann et al. (2003) and Hille and Straubhaar (2001) use a static flow model approach. See Baas 
and Brücker (2010) for a discussion of the alternative approaches. 
25 The estimated coefficients for the lagged migrant stock suggest that the migrant stock in the destination 
countries grows without boundaries as it takes a value which is larger than one. Hence, the model 
specification cannot be appropriate to explain the adjustment process at least in the short-run after the EU 
enlargement. The identification strategy for the dynamic stock model and the results of the estimations are 
presented in the appendix. 
26 One might argue that, without including the EU-10 and EU-2 member states as destination countries, an 
incomplete picture of the migration dynamics in the EU is drawn. However, empirical studies of migration 
flows to the EU-10 or EU-2 or between the two regions come to the conclusion that these movements are 






Like in Pedersen et al. (2008), the dependent variable ∆mij,t denotes the annual change in the 
diaspora ratio.27 It describes a net change since the remigration decision is considered. 
Applying this definition has an advantage over the analysis of gross changes. It accounts for 
the fact that, for example, a change of the net wage in a destination country does not only 
affect the gross inflow of migrants, but at the same time has an effect on the remigration from 
the diaspora. Without death and naturalization, the change in the diaspora ratio measures the 
annual net emigration of the selected group from the source. 
A challenge of analyzing determinants of migration flows is defining a strategy that is robust 
to possible estimation biases through reverse causality. An increase in the nominal net wage 
level might deliver a good explanation for an increase in the migrant stock as the destination 
country becomes more attractive due to the improved employment conditions. However, there 
might be an alternative, reverse explanation: migrants bring capital into the destination 
country and thereby increase the nation-wide capital to labor ratio. The increase in the 
compensation of human capital might thus be the result of the immigrant inflow rather than 
the cause of it. In order to address these possible endogeneity issues through reverse causality, 
I regress the current change rate in the diaspora ratio on explanatory variables that are lagged 
by one period. This procedure does not guarantee strict exogeneity, but it assures 
predeterminancy of the regressors (Mayda, 2010). 
Dj,t-1 is a vector that consists of the destination country-specific factors influencing the 
migration and remigration decision. It contains the annual nominal net wage in 10,000 Euro, 
the unemployment rate in % and the size of the population in million persons in the 
destination. In addition, a Southern European country dummy which takes the value 1 if the 
destination country is located in Southern Europe28 and a migration regime dummy which 
takes the value 1 if the freedom of movement for workers is restricted according to the 2+3+2 
rule are included. Last, but not least, the ratio of the public social expenditures to the GDP 
level in the destination countries is added as a measurement for the generosity of the welfare 
state. Nij,t-1 consists of the source-destination-specific network effects. It does not only 
account for the size of the diaspora (number of persons in million) in the destination, but also 
for its composition as it includes the average education level, the proportion of females and 
the employment rate in the diaspora cohort as regressors. Si,t-1 represents a vector describing 
the socio-economic characteristics of the source population. It includes two variables, the 
average education level and the proportion of employed persons in the source cohort.29 
                                                 
27  In contrast to the numbers in Table 2, which are in percent, it measures the number of migrants per 1000 
persons in the source. 
28  The dummy takes the value 1 if the destination country is Greece, Italy, Portugal or Spain and 0 for the other 
eight destination countries. It is assumed that the four Southern countries are characterized by a favorable 
climate which acts as a pull factor. For a discussion of the climate as a pull factor, see Graves (1980). 






The education level is measured based on the International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED). In order to facilitate the comparison and in line with the literature30, the 
educational achievements are categorized in three groups (low, medium and high) taking the 
values 1, 2 and 3. The low education group comprises of the ISCED levels 0 to 2 (early 
childhood education to lower secondary education). The medium level covers the ISCED 
levels 3 to 4 (upper secondary education to short-cycle tertiary education) while the high 
education level subsumes the ISCED levels 5 and 6 (bachelor or equivalent to doctoral or 
equivalent). 
Finally, Iij,t-1 contains interaction effects of all push and pull factors (Dj,t-1, Nij,t-1, Si,t-1) with the 
migration regime dummy (2+3+2 rule) for the destination country. By including this vector, 
the differential effects of the migration determinants under the temporary restriction of the 
freedom of movement are controlled for. ci is a source cohort fixed effect. It controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity of the age groups in the different groups of source countries. 
Further, in all regressions, time dummies for each period are included, which are represented 
by the vector Tt. In contrast to, for example, Pedersen et al. (2008), I do not include 
destination (cj) or destination-source pair (cij) fixed effects. The destination country fixed 
effects would “eat up” the effect of the observed destination country-specific pull factors that 
do not show considerable variation over time (for example, the country’s ratio of social 
expenditures to GDP).31 The error term εij,t is assumed to be normally distributed and 
clustered over time periods and destination countries. The clustering problem is addressed by 
the estimation of cluster robust standard errors. I apply the STATA routine provided by 
Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) that accounts for non-nested two-way clustering in error 
terms.32 
 
5.3. Regression results 
 
Table 3 below shows the results of the pooled OLS regression analysis. The number of cell 
entries in the country panel is reduced as some diaspora ratios are constructed based on less 
than 50 individual observations in the EU-LFS sample. These estimates are presumably 
biased and thus are excluded. After dropping the data points, on average, each diaspora cohort 
is constructed based on 466 individual observations in the EU-LFS sample. The number of 
                                                 
30  I reduce the dimension of the classification to three groups as this is done in most applications (see, for 
example, Pedersen et al., 2008, or Beine et al., 2011). It is distinguished between a high, medium and low 
level of education which are denoted on a scale from 1 to 3.  
31  This well-known problem in the literature is described by Pedersen et al. (2008). Since it also applies to 
estimations that make use of the country panel structure of the constructed data set, I do not present results 
from FE panel estimations. 
32  Since potential clustering of the cohorts from one group of source countries in a destination is nested in the 
clustering over the destination country itself, there is no need to additionally adjust the error terms. This 
cluster effect is also captured by clustering the error terms with respect to the destination countries. For a 
discussion of the different treatment of nested and non-nested multi-way clustering, see Cameron, Gelbach 






constructed cohort observations is 432.33 In the appendix, I also present the regression results 
with diaspora ratios that are constructed based on at least 10 individual observations.34 Since 
the results of both estimations do not significantly differ, I expect the bias from the exclusion 
of ratios to be negligible. In the first four specifications (1) - (4), I model the effect of the 
2+3+2 rule in a very simple manner by the inclusion of a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 if the freedom of movement is restricted and the value 0 if not. In specification (5), the 
model structure becomes more sophisticated as, in addition, interaction effects of the 
migration regime dummy with the other push and pull factors are added. In the following 
interpretation, I first explain the results of specification (1) to (4) and then focus separately on 
the fifth specification. 
As expected, the annual nominal net wage in 10,000 Euro positively affects the annual 
migration inflows to a destination. In specification (1) to (4), the coefficient is significant at 
the 1 % level and ranges between values of 1.792 and 2.143. The effect of the unemployment 
rate in % is less clear cut since the estimated coefficients are all insignificant at the 10 % 
level. However, the negative signs are line with economic theory. Larger unemployment rates 
should imply smaller numbers of immigrant inflows. With respect to the employment 
opportunities, migrants seem to put more weight on the expected compensation of labor than 
on the unemployment likelihood approximated by the unemployment rate. 
The size of the destination country measured by the population in million persons seems to 
have a positive effect on immigration. The value of the coefficients ranges from 0.003 to 
0.017. However, the effect is only significant at the 5 % level in specification (1). I further 
control for the attractiveness of a destination country in terms of the geographic position by 
including a dummy for the Southern European countries. The dummy takes the value 1 if the 
destination country is Greece, Italy, Portugal or Spain and 0 otherwise. Although this 
classification is arguably arbitrary, the significance of the estimated effects in all 
specifications at the 1 % level gives strong support for the idea that destination countries in 
the South are endowed with unobserved factors that attract migrants. These might be non-
economic factors like a mild climate or a high quality of life (Graves, 1980). In specification 
(1) to (4), the restrictions of the freedom of movement are modeled with a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if a restriction is in place and 0 if not.35 Surprisingly, the coefficients of 
the migration regime dummy show a positive sign in the first four specifications, but the 
standard errors indicate that the coefficients are not significantly different from 0.  
                                                 
33  The mean of the number of individual observations per cohort is 466.49, the standard deviation is 700.22. 
The smallest number of observations per cohort is 51, the largest is 5884. 
34  In this case, the number of constructed cohort observations is 621. The mean number of individual 
observations per cohort is reduced to 339.36. The standard deviation is 615.16, the minimum value 10 and 
the maximum value 5884. 
35 Unfortunately, I cannot distinguish between the source countries Cyprus and Malta that were not affected by 
the restrictions and the Eastern European member states (EU-8). However, since the population in Cyprus 
and Malta is relatively small, it is arguable that the effects of the transitional periods on the immigration 






Table 3:  Static flow model estimates for 12 EU-15 destination countries (j) and 9 source cohorts (i) 
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Δmij,t = annual change in the diaspora ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Destination country variables Dj,t-1 
Annual nominal net wage        1.792*** 1.967*** 1.992*** 2.143*** 4.508** 
      in 10,000 Euro in j (0.347) (0.487) (0.563) (0.576) (1.952) 
Unemployment rate in % in j   -0.040 -0.072 -0.084 -0.082 -0.329*** 
 (0.043) (0.056) (0.082) (0.101) (0.119) 
Population in destination         0.017** 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.029 
      country j in mio. persons    (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.025) 
Southern European                   2.762*** 3.317*** 3.535*** 3.948*** 7.926*** 
      country (0/1) (0.399) (0.681) (0.935) (0.939) (1.936) 
Regime dummy (restricted  0.822 0.934 0.969 0.873 -10.436 
      freedom of m.) in j (0/1)    (0.729) (0.782) (0.789) (1.146) (10.500) 
Public social expenditures       2.322 4.988 9.493** 12.829*** 5.897 
      / GDP in j              (5.179) (5.691) (4.410) (4.855) (10.227) 
Source-destination (network) effects Nij,t-1 
Diaspora stock in j in mio.  1.171 0.848 0.986 1.132 
      persons  (0.949) (1.047) (0.920) (3.055) 
Education level (ISCED)   0.660 1.120 3.890 
      in age-specific diaspora   (1.031) (0.955) (2.918) 
Proportion of females        -4.303* -5.050* -2.731 
      in age-specific diaspora  (2.543) (2.925) (3.534) 
Proportion of employed  0.318 0.557 -2.855 
      in age-specific diaspora  (2.571) (2.645) (3.599) 
Source specific factors Si, t-1 
Education level (ISCED) in     3.579 1.001 -4.271 
      source cohort  (3.416) (7.327) (5.739) 
Proportion of employed in  -5.603 -19.142* -17.305** 
      source cohort  (8.846) (10.111) (8.650) 
Interaction of push-pull factors and the migration regime Iij,t-1a
Annual nominal net wage        -3.479* 
      x regime dummy (2.004) 
Unemployment rate 0.438** 
      x regime dummy (0.194) 
Public social expenditures /     -5.147 
      GDP x regime dummy (10.730) 
Diaspora stock in j in mio. -1.996 
      persons x regime dummy  (4.239) 
Proportion of employed in  -5.890 
      source x regime dummy (16.186) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Age and source dummies yes yes yes no no 
Source cohort dummies no no no yes yes 
Constant included                    yes yes yes yes yes 
R-squared                                 0.286 0.298 0.315 0.338 0.474 
Number of observations           432 432 432 432 432 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors that are clustered by destination country and time periods are 
shown in parentheses. I use the STATA routine by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) to control for two-way 
clustered error terms. In all regressions, time dummies and a constant are included. a Further variables are 
included: see Appendix for a table with all covariates. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year except 






According to economic theory, the dummy should enter the equation with a negative sign as 
the introduction of a restriction on the free movement for workers increases migration costs 
and should, consequently, result in a decrease of the migration inflow. The regression results 
though give an indication for the need of a more sophisticated modeling of the restricted 
freedom of movement as suggested by Razin and Wahba (2011). 
A potential “welfare magnet” effect is modeled by the inclusion of the ratio of public social 
expenditures to GDP as a covariate. While in (1) and (2), the level of social expenditures 
relative to the GDP does not have a statistically significant effect on the diaspora ratio, the 
coefficients in (3) and (4) have a positive sign and are significant at the 1 % respective 5 % 
level. These results give an indication that the generosity of the welfare state measured by the 
ratio of public social expenditures to the GDP might represent a pull factor for potential 
migrants. Furthermore, it seems to be the case that the pull effect of the benefits cannot be 
identified if the socio-economic characteristics in the diaspora cohorts are not controlled for. 
After including these additional controls, the “welfare magnet” can be disentangled from the 
pull effects of the diaspora characteristics. 
The vector Dj,t-1 that represents the destination specific pull factors is included in all 
regressions. In specification (1), the annual change in the diaspora ratio is exclusively 
regressed on these destination specific variables. Specification (2) differs from (1) as the size 
of the diaspora from the same group of source countries in million persons is added as a 
regressor. The inclusion weakly increases the explanatory power of the model to an R-squared 
value of 0.298. The coefficients of the diaspora stock effect are positive in (2) to (4), but the 
reported standard errors indicate insignificance of the effects. In contrast to the findings of 
Beine et al. (2011) and Pedersen et al. (2008) who identify significant effects of the diaspora 
size on migration decisions in OECD countries, I do not find empirical support for the 
network effect in the EU-15. 
In specification (3), the regression is enriched by the inclusion of further variables measuring 
the source-destination network effect. The average education level, the proportion of 
employed and the proportion of females in the diaspora cohorts are added. However, only the 
proportion of females has a negative, significant effect on the annual change of the diaspora 
ratio. This observation might be explained by migration patterns that reflect a traditional 
division in gender roles within families. If men tend to migrate before their wives due to job-
related incentives, for instance, a small share of females in the diaspora corresponds to a large 
potential of female partners in the source. On the way to the “new equilibrium” which is 
characterized by female migration due to family reunification, the potential for further 
migration deteriorates. This phenomenon finds its expression in a decreasing effect of the 
proportion of females in the diaspora on the annual change rate in the diaspora ratio. 
Furthermore, two source-specific factors are considered: the average education level and the 






education level in the source has an impact on the dependent variable, the proportion of 
employed in the source cohort seems to negatively affect the annual change in the diaspora 
ratio. For specification (4), a significant negative effect with a coefficient value of -19.142 is 
reported. This is in line with the economic intuition. An increase in the employment rate of a 
source country has a positive effect on the employment opportunities of the workers. Hence, 
the incentive to emigrate for job reasons diminishes if the employment rate expands. Overall, 
the additional covariates in (3) improve the explanatory power to an R-squared value of 
0.315. While in specification (1) to (3), age and source country group dummies are included 
separately, in specification (4), I use a dummy for each source cohort. Again, this leads to a 
weak increase in the explanatory power of the model to an R-squared value of 0.338.  
Finally, in specification (5), vector Iij,t-1 is considered for the first time. This vector accounts 
for the recent findings by Razin and Wahba (2011). It contains interaction effects of the 
migration regime dummy with all push and pull factors. The explanatory power of the model 
increases to an R-square value of 0.474 indicating a significant improvement of the 
identification strategy. The coefficient of the annual nominal net wage effect in the 
destination country has a value of 4.508 which is 2 to 3 times the size of the coefficients in (1) 
to (4). For the interaction effect of the wage variable with the 2+3+2 rule dummy, a 
coefficient of -3.479 is reported. The application of the rule reduces the wage effect from 
4.508 to 1.029 which leads to the conclusion that the restriction of the freedom of movement 
is binding with respect to the net wage as a pull factor. 
The dummy variable for Southern European destination countries also increases significantly 
in (5) under a scenario where the freedom of movement is not restricted. It takes a value of 
7.926 compared to values of 2 to 4 in specification (1) to (4). The effect is completely offset 
in the case of a restricted freedom of movement for workers. In addition, the direct effect of 
the migration regime dummy variable becomes negative even though the estimator is 
insignificant. It has a coefficient value of -10.436 which has a reducing the effect on the 
constant. As expected, the application of restrictions on the mobility of workers reduces the 
migration incentive in addition to the interaction effects with the other pull factors. 
The coefficient of the social expenditure variable decreases to a value of 5.897 and is not 
significant. This result stands in contrast to the findings of Razin and Wahba (2011) who 
argue that the “welfare magnet” effect should increase in size and significance when the 
differential effect of the migration regime is controlled for. The comparison of specification 
(3) and (4) in which the migration regime is controlled for solely by the inclusion of a dummy 
variable delivers interest insights. In these cases, the benefits seem to act as a pull factor. 
However, by modeling the effects of the restricted freedom of movement more realistically 
with interaction effects, the significance of the welfare state as pull factor disappears while the 
coefficient of the unemployment rate in the destination becomes significant. The integration 






For the interaction effect of the “welfare magnet” variable with the 2+3+2 rule dummy, a 
coefficient value of -5.147 is found. A potential pull effect of the welfare state variable would 
be almost completely offset by the application of the 2+3+2 rule. Since I find rather mixed 
evidence with respect to the “welfare magnet” effect, the next section is devoted to a 
sensitivity analysis with alternative measurements for the welfare state. 
 
5.4. Alternative modeling of the welfare state 
 
In specification (1) to (5), the welfare state is modeled by including the ratio of public social 
expenditures to GDP as covariate which is also done in the studies by Beine et al. (2011) and 
Pedersen et al. (2008). However, there are other measurements for the welfare state generosity 
that are applied in the literature. De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009), for instance, calculate the 
net replacement income in purchasing power and include it in the regressions to identify a 
potential “welfare magnet” effect. In the following section, I thus perform estimations with 
alternative measurements of the generosity of welfare states as robustness checks. 
In Table 4 below, I modify specification (5) shown in Table 3. The ratio of social 
expenditures to GDP is replaced by the net replacement rate in (6) and by the nominal 
replacement income in (7). The net replacement rate is calculated as the ratio of annual net 
earnings and out-of-work income for a single person without children (100 % average wage) 
in each destination country while the nominal replacement income measured in 10,000 Euro 
is the annual out-of-work income for a single person without children earning 100% of the 
average wage. Housing benefits are included. Both measurements are provided by the OECD 
Statistics Out of Work Tax / Benefit.  
In specification (6), the coefficient of the annual nominal net wage is comparable in size to 
the estimation in specification (5) and significant at the 1 % level. The unemployment rate 
enters with a negative sign and with a significance level of 1 %. Furthermore, the dummy 
indicating a Southern European destination country has a slightly larger effect than in (5) with 
a significant, positive coefficient at the 1 % level. The alternative measurement of the welfare 
state generosity, the net replacement rate in % in the destination country, does not seem to 
have an effect on the immigration flows since the standard errors indicate an insignificance of 
the effect. However, the coefficient has a positive sign which is in line with expectation. 
In specification (7), the net wage effect is also relatively similar in size compared to the other 
setups. However, the estimator for the coefficient is only significant at the 10 % level. The 
coefficient for the net replacement income has a value of 1.546, but is insignificant according 
to the calculated standard errors. One explanation for the low significance levels of both, the 
net wage and the net replacement income effect, might be a multi-collinearity phenomenon 








Table 4:  Static flow model estimates with alternative measurements for the welfare state 
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Δmij,t = annual change in the diaspora ratio 
 (6) (7) 
Destination country variables Xj,t-1 
Annual nominal net wage in 10,000 Euro in j 5.108*** 4.391* 
 (1.610) (2.467) 
Unemployment rate in % in j -0.401*** -0.420*** 
 (0.098) (0.115) 
Population in destination country j in mio. persons 0.038* 0.039** 
 (0.020) (0.019) 
Southern European country (0/1) 9.272*** 9.305*** 
 (1.722) (1.704) 
Regime dummy (restricted freedom of m.) in j (0/1) -11.059 -9.450 
 (7.794) (8.401) 
Net replacement rate in % in j 2.770 
 (4.860) 
Annual replacement income in 10,000 Euro in j 1.546 
 (2.971) 
Source-destination (network) effects Nij,t-1 
Diaspora stock in j in mio. persons 0.508 0.710 
 (2.842) (2.844) 
Education level (ISCED) in the age-specific diaspora 2.964 3.043 
 (1.845) (1.950) 
Proportion of females in the age-specific diaspora -1.532 -1.592 
 (3.130) (3.241) 
Proportion of employed in the age-specific diaspora -3.480 -3.716 
 (4.150) (4.055) 
Source specific factors Si, t-1 
Education level (ISCED) in the source cohort  -3.515 -3.584 
 (4.237) (4.327) 
Proportion of employed in the source cohort -18.296** -18.679** 
 (8.632) (8.133) 
Interaction of push-pull factors and the migration regime Iij,t-1a
Annual nominal net wage x regime dummy -4.129** -3.200 
(1.606) (2.531) 
Unemployment rate x regime dummy 0.505*** 0.537*** 
(0.145) (0.149) 
Diaspora stock in j in mio. persons x regime dummy -1.393 -1.595 
(3.860) (3.891) 
Net replacement rate x regime dummy -2.668 
(4.487) 
Annual replacement income x regime dummy -1.925 
(2.852) 
Proportion of unemployed in the source cohort x  -4.262 -3.813 
      regime dummy (16.629) (16.311) 
Source cohort dummies yes yes 
R-squared 0.475 0.475 
Number of observations 432 432 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors that are clustered by destination country and time periods are 
shown in parentheses. I use the STATA routine provided by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) to control for 
two-way clustered error terms. In all regressions, time dummies and a constant are included. a Further variables 
are included: see Appendix for a table with all covariates. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year 






5.5. Comparison of effects 
 
The magnitude of the effects is difficult to evaluate since the dimensions of the explanatory 
variables differ. So how can we interpret the coefficients in order to draw conclusions about 
their relevance? In Table 5 below, I compare a selection of economic effects that seem to have 
a major impact on the migration flows in the EU-15. The effects are made comparable by 
presenting the change of the dependent variable after a change in the explanatory variable by 
1 standard deviation of the mean. In the second column, the standardized measurement for a 
change in the explanatory variable is introduced. In column 3, the coefficients of the direct 
effect and of the interaction effect with the migration regime dummy are shown. Column 4 
presents the change of the dependent variable for the free movement scenario after a 
standardized increase in the explanatory variable. Equivalently, in column 5, the changes of 
the dependent variable for the restricted movement scenario are summarized. 
 
Table 5: Comparison of the economic effects on migration flows in the EU-15 
Explanatory 
variable 
Δ of 1 standard 
dev. from mean 
of the expl. var. 
Coefficients:  











Annual nominal net 
wage in 10,000 
Euro in destination 
0.614  
(6140 Euro) 
(4) 2.143*** / none 
(5) 4.508** / -3.479* 
(6) 5.108*** / -4.129** 



















(4) -0.082 / none 




















(4) -19.142* / none 
(5) -17.305** / -5.890 
(6) -18.296** / -4.262 














/ GDP in the 
destination country  
0.033  
(3.3 %-points) 
(4) 12.829*** / none 
(5) 5.897 / -5.147 
(4) 0.423 
(5) 0.195 
        - 
(5) 0.025 
        - 
(5) 0.170 
Net replacement 
rate in % in the 
destination country  
0.181  
(18.1 %-points) 
(6) 2.770 / -2.668 (6) 0.501 (6) -0.018 (6) 0.519 
Annual replacement 
income in 10,000 
Euro in destination 
0.580  
(5800 Euro) 
(7) 1.546 / -1.925 (7) 0.897 (7) -0.220 (7) 1.117 
 
In specification (5), a standardized increase in a destination country’s annual net wage (6,140 
Euro) increases the annual change in the diaspora ratio by 2.768.36 This translates into about 
2.8 additional persons out of 1000 persons in the source migrating to the destination per year. 
The effect is reduced to about 0.6 persons per 1000 if the freedom of movement is restricted.37 
                                                 
36 6,140 / 10,000 x 4.508 = 2.768 (see column 4). 






Applying a restrictive migration regime thus has a differential effect of about 2.1 persons per 
1000 persons in the source on the annual change in the diaspora ratio.38 The effects of the 
unemployment rate in a destination country are less strong. In specification (6) and (7), for the 
free movement scenario, a decrease in the dependent variable of about 1.2 is reported after an 
increase in the unemployment rate by 2.996 percentage points. In the restricted freedom of 
movement scenario, a slightly positive effect is found which is not extremely different from 
the expected maximum value of 0 (column 5). If the proportion of employed in a source 
cohort increases by 5.6 percentage points, the annual change in the diaspora ratio decreases by 
about 1 in the free movement scenario. The effects in the case of the restricted migration 
regime are insignificant. This might be an indicator that the push effects are not affected by 
the application of restrictions in a single destination while the pull effects are more or less 
exactly offset by the application of the 2+3+2 rule. 
In specification (4), an increase in the ratio of the social expenditures to the GDP level by 3.3 
percentage points results in an increase in the dependent variable of 0.423. This much larger 
effect than in (5) is significant at the 1 % level. However, with respect to the magnitude, it is 
still of minor importance. The effect of both, the nominal net wage in a destination and the 
proportion of employed in the source cohort, is twice to three times as large as the “welfare 
magnet” effect. For specification (5), a hypothetical change in the dependent variable of 0.195 
is reported for the free movement scenario and almost no effect for the restricted movement 
regime (column 5). Though, the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant.  
As result of the comparison, the following findings should be emphasized. First, the net wage 
in a destination country exerts a much larger positive effect on the migrant inflows than the 
public social expenditures. The coefficients in specification (5) indicate an effect of the net 
wage which is about 14 times as large as the effect of the welfare state variable. In addition, 
the standard error of the welfare state coefficient points to a statistical insignificance of the 
effect. Under the assumption that the findings in specification (4) most accurately describe the 
reality, the effect of the net wage is still three times as large as the effect of the social 
expenditure variable. In the case of the net replacement rate and the annual replacement 
income, the gap lies between those two extremes.39 Secondly, restricting the freedom of 
movement almost completely offsets the migration incentives of the pull factors, but does not 




                                                 
38 See column 6 which presents the difference in the values of column 4 and column 5. 
39 I find that the effect of the net wage is about six times as large as the non-significant net replacement rate 
effect and three times as large as the non-significant replacement income effect. De Giorgi and Pellizzari 
(2009) report a net wage effect that is about 10 times as large as the “welfare magnet” effect of the 








The EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 initiated a debate about the future of the welfare 
states in the EU-15. According to Kvist (2004) and Sinn (2002), the logic of “welfare 
magnetism” might cause strategic behavior of national governments with respect to the 
generosity of the welfare state. Hence, policy makers were expected to reduce the level of 
social security to avoid their countries becoming attractive destinations for “welfare 
migrants”. In addition, national governments were endowed with another strategic instrument 
for reducing the potential pressure from these migration incentives: the 2+3+2 rule which 
allows the closing of borders for migrants from the new member states by temporarily 
restricting the freedom of movement for workers. 
In this paper, the interaction of these two policy variables in the EU-15 after 2002 is analyzed. 
The first result is that the race to the bottom after the accession decision did not happen as 
predicted. OECD data on the development of the social expenditures relative to GDP and the 
net replacement rates in the destination countries after 2002 give no indication of a strong EU-
15 wide reduction in spending on welfare. Secondly, in the analysis of determinants of 
migration flows to EU-15 countries from 2004 to 2011, evidence is found that the “welfare 
magnet” effect is rather weak or does not persist at all and presumably does not influence 
national decision making. The ratio of social expenditures to GDP as a measurement for the 
welfare state generosity does not seem to have a positive effect on the immigration flows to 
EU-15 countries. The expected payments in the case of unemployment measured by the net 
replacement rate and the net replacement income do also not act as “welfare magnets”. In 
contrast, the application of the 2+3+2 rule is found to have a strong impact on migration 
behavior. It completely offsets, for example, the positive incentive effect of the net wage or a 
low unemployment rate in a destination country.  
Thus, two reasons can be identified which explain the observation that the race to the bottom 
did not take place after 2002. First, the “welfare magnet” effect is just one determinant among 
a large number of other determinants of migration decisions and is probably of too little 
relevance to justify major welfare state reforms in the EU-15. Secondly, the application of 
restrictions on the freedom of movement for workers completely neutralizes potential effects 
of the welfare state. Hence, national governments might have used this instrument as a 
substitute for modifications of the welfare system. Furthermore, evidence is found that the 
positive migration incentives from a larger remuneration of human capital are also offset in 
the case of restricted freedom of movement for workers. Countries with restrictions are thus 
not able to reap the economic benefits from labor mobility as described by Sinn (2002).  
A comparison of the marginal effects shows that the “welfare magnet” effect is completely 
offset by the application of the 2+3+2 rule. But even in the case where the freedom of 






Based on the results of this analysis, it thus seems unlikely that the end of the 2+3+2 period 
for Bulgaria and Romania in January 2014 will initiate major reforms of national welfare state 
institutions in the EU-15 or even start a race to the bottom of welfare state standards. This 
prediction is supported by the experience in countries that already opened the labor market for 
workers from the EU-2. In Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Sweden, no 
evidence for adjustments of the welfare state can be found after the realization of the freedom 
of movement for EU-2 workers. That is why there is no reason to expect strongly diverging 
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A.1.  Alternative measurements of the generosity of the welfare states 
 
Figure 1A: Development of the public social expenditures per capita with constant prices (2000) and 





Source:  OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) - Public social spending per capita (in 













































A.2.  Description of the variables and the data sources 
 
Dependent variable: 
Δmij,t: Annual change in the diapora ratio (number of migrants in the destination per 1000 
persons in the source cohort) calculated with data from the EU-Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS) 
2004 to 2011. Source: Eurostat. 
Explanatory variables: 
1. Destination country variables Dij,t-1 
Annual nominal net wage in 10,000 Euro in j: Nominal annual net earnings in 10,000 Euro 
in the destination country for a single person without children (100 % of the average wage), 
2004 - 2010. Source: Eurostat.  
Unemployment rate in % in j: Annual average of the unemployment rate in % in the 
destination country (not seasonally adjusted), 2004 - 2010. Source: Eurostat. 
Population in destination country j in mio. persons: Population size in the destination 
country in million of persons, 1st January of the year, 2004 - 2010. Source: Eurostat. 
Southern European country (0/1): Dummy variable for destination countries in Southern 
Europe (“climate dummy”). It takes the value 1 for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain and the 
value 0 for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, United 
Kingdom. 
Regime dummy (restricted freedom of movement) in j (0/1): Dummy variable for the 
application of temporary restrictions to the freedom of movement (2+3+2 rule) in the 
destination country. It takes the value 1 if a country restricts labor market access for workers 
from the EU-10 or EU-2 in that year and the value 0 if no restrictions are applied. If the 
restrictions are lifted during the year, for example, on the 1st of May 2011, the dummy value 
is 0 as if there was no restriction in place during the whole year. Source: EU Commission, DG 
Employment. 
Public social expenditures / GDP in j: Ratio of public social spending to the gross domestic 
product in the destination country. Numbers are based on detailed OECD data for 2004 to 
2007 and projections of the aggregated spending for 2008 to 2010. It contains cash benefits 
and benefits in kind. Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). 
Annual replacement income in 10,000 Euro in j: Annual out-of-work income in 10,000 
Euro for a single person without children (100 % of the average wage), 2004 – 2010. Housing 
benefits are included (applies to Greece, Ireland, United Kingdom). Source: OECD Statistics, 
Out of work tax / benefit. 
Net replacement rate in % in j: Net replacement rate in the case of unemployment in the 
destination country. Rate is calculated as the ratio of annual net earnings and out-of-work 
income for a single person without children (100 % average wage). Source: Eurostat, OECD 
Statistics Out of work tax / benefit. 
2. Source-destination (network) effects Nij,t-1 
Diaspora stock in j in mio. persons: Total number of persons with a nationality of an EU-15 
(other than the destination), EU-10 or EU-2 country in the destination country, in million 
persons. Source: Own calculations based on the EU-LFS, Central Register of Foreigners, 






Education level (ISCED) in age-specific diaspora: Average education level (ISCED) in the 
age-specific diaspora stock in the destination country. Based on the ISCED score, three 
education levels are built. The variable value for low education is set to 1 and consists of the 
ISCED levels 0 to 2, the variable value for medium education is set to 2 and consists of the 
ISCED levels 3 and 4 and the variable value for high education is set to 3 and consists of the 
ISCED levels 5 and 6. Source: Own calculations based on the EU-LFS.  
Proportion of females in age-specific diaspora:  Proportion of female persons in the age-
specific diaspora stock. Source: Own calculations based on the EU-LFS. 
Proportion of employed in age-specific diaspora: Proportion of employed persons in the 
age-specific diaspora stock in the destination country. Source: Own calculations based on the 
EU-LFS. 
3. Source specific factors Si, t-1 
Education level (ISCED) in source cohort: Average education level (ISCED) in the age-
specific cohort in the source region (EU-15, EU-10 or EU-2). Based on the ISCED score, 
three education levels are built. The variable value for low education is set to 1 and consists of 
the ISCED levels 0 to 2, the variable value for medium education is set to 2 and consists of 
the ISCED levels 3 and 4 and the variable value for high education is set to 3 and consists of 
the ISCED levels 5 and 6. Source: Own calculations based on the EU-LFS. 
Proportion of employed in source cohort: Proportion of employed persons in the age-
specific cohort in the source region. Source: Own calculations based on the EU-LFS. 
 
A.3.  Migrant stocks with EU-15 nationality in the destination countries 
 
Figure 2A: Number of migrants with an EU-15 nationality in the EU-15 countries (2004 - 2011). 
 
 
Source:  EU-LFS (2004-2011), for Germany: Central Register of Foreigners, Federal Office of 
Administration Germany (2004-2011). 
Notes: Denmark, Finland and Sweden are excluded. Ireland only provides EU-LFS data for the 
years 2004 to 2005 and 2008 to 2010. Italy does not provide data for 2004. All estimates 
































A.4.  Construction of diaspora ratios 
 
Table 1A: Migrant stocks in the destination countries, grouped by age and source region (2010) 
Cohort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Source reg. EU-15 EU-15 EU-15 EU-10 EU-10 EU-10 EU-2 EU-2 EU-2 
Age band 15-24 25-34 35-44 15-24 25-34 35-44 15-24 25-34 35-44 
in Austria 20953 35314 41994 8530 25318 21875 7342 14697 9139 
in Belgium 42375 72942 105464 (3933) 17018 12787 4639 14804 9293 
in Germany 155679 272619 358197 (62169) 152976 155362 (25233) (41456) (46387) 
in Spain 58229 111571 167403 (12477) (34673) (32302) 139337 273130 258286 
in France 61936 114680 219996 (2035) 23189 10629 9305 28095 18372 
in Greece (2152) 3780 5603 5463 6162 5540 8245 22486 20950 
in Ireland 11347 25312 29113 24952 92423 25575 2397 6130 3976 
in Italy 5431 21849 33459 9754 45939 31187 119667 308917 247423 
in Luxemb. 20028 32838 37876 (277) (1302) 1449 (184) (848) (404) 
in Netherl. 13147 29330 45397 (4538) (12363) (7647) (1465) (6771) (3486) 
in Portugal 3327 5912 6883 (60) (1783) (79) 3701 7589 4436 
in United K. 104672 184856 185375 146943 422097 124159 (24536) 63457 (18983) 
 
Source:  Own calculations based on the EU-LFS 2010. The cell entries in brackets are estimations 
that are based on less than 50 observations in the EU-LFS. Thus, these estimations should 
be treated very carefully as they might be biased due to the small number of observations 
in the sample. 
 
Table 2A:  Population in source regions, grouped by age and source region (2010, in millions) 
Cohort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Source reg. EU-15 EU-15 EU-15 EU-10 EU-10 EU-10 EU-2 EU-2 EU-2 
Age band 15-24 25-34 35-44 15-24 25-34 35-44 15-24 25-34 35-44 
Austria 44.75 50.48 57.64 9.72 11.63 10.05 3.89 4.27 4.56 
Belgium 44.44 50.16 57.40 9.72 11.63 10.05 3.89 4.27 4.56 
Germany 36.19 41.58 46.80 9.72 11.63 10.05 3.89 4.27 4.56 
Spain 40.97 44.29 51.25 9.72 11.63 10.05 3.89 4.27 4.56 
France 38.31 43.94 50.37 9.72 11.63 10.05 3.89 4.27 4.56 
Greece 44.66 50.00 57.22 9.72 11.63 10.05 3.89 4.27 4.56 
Ireland 45.21 50.79 58.26 9.72 11.63 10.05 3.89 4.27 4.56 
Italy 39.69 43.90 49.19 9.72 11.63 10.05 3.89 4.27 4.56 
Luxemburg 45.70 51.49 58.85 9.72 11.63 10.05 3.89 4.27 4.56 
Netherlands 43.75 49.58 56.50 9.72 11.63 10.05 3.89 4.27 4.56 
Portugal 44.60 49.98 57.32 9.72 11.63 10.05 3.89 4.27 4.56 
United K. 37.69 43.44 50.14 9.72 11.63 10.05 3.89 4.27 4.56 
 







A.5. Summary statistics 
 
Table 3A: Summary statistics of the country panel (minimum of 50 observations per cohort) 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Annual change in the diaspora ratio 432 0.748 2.578 -6.458 17.246 
Diaspora stock in mio. persons 432 0.378 0.440 0.005 1.660 
Education level in diaspora cohort 432 1.955 0.307 1.282 2.753 
Prop. of females in diaspora cohort 432 0.552 0.095 0.347 0.916 
Prop. of employed in diaspora cohort 432 0.886 0.078 0.549 1 
Population in source cohort in mio. 432 28.056 21.394 3.892 60.629 
Education level in source cohort 432 1.925 0.225 1.458 2.251 
Prop. of females in source cohort 432 0.494 0.004 0.484 0.501 
Prop. of employed in source cohort 432 0.892 0.056 0.683 0.955 
Annual net wage in 10,000 Euro 432 2.246 0.614 1.098 3.613 
Unemployment rate in % 432 7.865 2.996 3.100 20.100 
Ratio of social exp. to GDP 432 0.249 0.033 0.161 0.322 
Net replacement rate in dest. country 432 0.451 0.181 0.071 0.698 
Net replacement income in 10,000 E. 432 1.077 0.580 0.125 2.147 
Population size in dest. country (mio) 432 32.265 27.406 0.455 82.532 
Southern European country 432 0.363 0.482 0 1  
Migration regime dummy 432 0.271 0.445 0 1  
 
 
Table 4A: Summary statistics of the country panel (minimum of 10 observations per cohort) 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Annual change in the diaspora ratio 621 0.618 2.281 -6.458 17.246 
Diaspora stock in mio. persons 621 0.291 0.400 0.000 1.660 
Education level in diaspora cohort 621 1.951 0.340 1.124 2.939 
Prop. of females in diaspora cohort 621 0.569 0.117 0.220 1 
Prop. of employed in diaspora cohort 621 0.870 0.117 0 1 
Population in source cohort in mio. 621 23.332 20.515 3.892 60.629 
Education level in source cohort 621 1.900 0.237 1.458 2.251 
Prop. of females in source cohort 621 0.494 0.004 0.484 0.501 
Prop. of employed in source cohort 621 0.883 0.063 0.683 0.955 
Annual net wage in 10,000 Euro 621 2.267 0.630 1.061 3.613 
Unemployment rate in % 621 7.863 3.087 3.100 20.100 
Ratio of social exp. to GDP 621 0.248 0.033 0.161 0.322 
Net replacement rate in dest. country 621 0.465 0.170 0.071 0.698 
Net replacement income in 10,000 E. 621 1.115 0.571 0.125 2.147 
Population size in dest. country (mio) 621 32.918 27.593 0.455 82.532 
Southern European country 621 0.343 0.475 0 1  
Migration regime dummy 621 0.367 0.482 0 1  
 
A.6. Results for the dynamic stock model 
 
Identification strategy: 







Table 5A:  Pooled OLS regression for the dynamic stock model (minimum of 50 obs. per cohort) 
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: mij,t = annual cohort-specific diaspora ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cohort-specific diaspora  1.080*** 1.106*** 1.104*** 1.105*** 1.059*** 
      ratio in t-1 (0.050) (0.044) (0.048) (0.052) (0.049) 
Destination country variables Dj,t-1 
Net wage in 10,000 in j            0.964** 0.593** 0.616 0.634** 2.037* 
 (0.383) (0.242) (0.438) (0.313) (1.057) 
Unemployment rate in j           -0.130*** -0.102 -0.112 -0.110 -0.338* 
 (0.050) (0.063) (0.073) (0.079) (0.184) 
Population in destination         0.013 0.017* 0.020 0.019** 0.036 
      country j in mio. (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.025) 
Southern country (0/1) 1.714** 1.002** 1.092 1.173* 3.889** 
 (0.690) (0.502) (0.752) (0.686) (1.886) 
Regime dummy (restricted  0.369 0.412 0.447 0.341 -5.915 
      freedom of m.) in j (0/1)    (0.614) (0.767) (0.742) (0.829) (6.975) 
Social expenditure          -2.019 -1.900 -0.204 0.674 -0.313 
      / GDP in j              (4.169) (3.520) (3.573) (3.013) (9.423) 
Source-destination (network) effects Nij,t-1 
Diaspora stock in j in mio.  -0.713 -0.922 -0.996 0.526 
  (0.672) (0.867) (0.809) (1.916) 
Education level (ISCED)   -0.131 -0.008 0.384 
      in age-specific diaspora   (0.721) (0.740) (1.522) 
Proportion of females        -2.773 -2.855 -2.250 
      in age-specific diaspora  (1.810) (1.892) (2.317) 
Proportion of employed  0.109 0.112 -1.782 
      in age-specific diaspora   (1.214) (0.977) (1.412) 
Source specific factors Si, t-1  
Education level (ISCED) in     3.230 -0.312 -6.372 
      source cohort  (2.721) (3.110) (5.140) 
Proportion of employed in  -5.140 -11.091 -4.626 
      source cohort  (8.055) (7.972) (5.384) 
Interaction: push-pull factors and migration regime Iij,t-1
Net wage x restriction -1.488 
(1.342) 
Unemployment rate                 0.411* 
      x regime dummy (0.237) 
Population in dest. country      -0.017 
      x regime dummy                (0.032) 
Southern country                      -3.593* 
      x regime dummy                (2.054) 
Social expenditures to GDP     -0.952 
      x regime dummy   (9.903) 
Diaspora stock in j in mio. -1.273 
      x regime dummy (2.582) 
Education level in diaspora      -0.430 
      x regime dummy                (1.246) 
Prop. of females in diaspora    0.538 
      x regime dummy        (3.434) 
Prop. of employed in                2.030 
      diaspora x regime d.           (1.622) 
Education level in source         4.245 
      cohort x regime dummy     (2.734) 
Prop. of  employed in  -15.388** 







Table 5A:  Pooled OLS regression for the dynamic stock model (continued) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Age and source dummies yes yes yes no no 
Source cohort dummies no no no yes yes 
Constant included                    yes yes yes yes yes 
R-squared                                 0.966 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.978 
Number of observations           504 486 486 486 486 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors that are clustered by destination country and time are shown in 
parentheses. I use the Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) procedure in Stata to control for two-way clustered 
error terms. In all regressions, time dummies and a constant are included. All explanatory variables are lagged by 
one year except for the regime dummy. 
 
A.7. Regression tables for the static flow model with all covariates 
 
Table 6A:  Estimates for the static flow model with all covariates (minimum of 50 obs. per cohort) 
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Δmij,t = annual change in the diaspora ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Destination country variables Dj,t-1 
Net wage in 10,000 in j           1.792*** 1.967*** 1.992*** 2.143*** 4.508** 
 (0.347) (0.487) (0.563) (0.576) (1.952) 
Unemployment rate in j           -0.040 -0.072 -0.084 -0.082 -0.329*** 
 (0.043) (0.056) (0.082) (0.101) (0.119) 
Population in destination         0.017** 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.029 
      country j in mio.                (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.025) 
Southern country (0/1)            2.762*** 3.317*** 3.535*** 3.948*** 7.926*** 
                       (0.399) (0.681) (0.935) (0.939) (1.936) 
Regime dummy (restricted  0.822 0.934 0.969 0.873 -10.436 
      freedom of m. in j (0/1)     (0.729) (0.782) (0.789) (1.146) (10.500) 
Social expenditures          2.322 4.988 9.493** 12.829*** 5.897 
      / GDP in j              (5.179) (5.691) (4.410) (4.855) (10.227) 
Source-destination (network) effects Nij,t-1 
Diaspora stock in j in mio. 1.171 0.848 0.986 1.132 
 -0.949 -1.047 -0.920 -3.055 
Education level (ISCED)  0.660 1.120 3.890 
      in age-specific diaspora  -1.031 -0.955 -2.918 
Proportion of females       -4.303* -5.050* -2.731 
      in age-specific diaspora -2.543 -2.925 -3.534 
Proportion of employed 0.318 0.557 -2.855 
      in age-specific diaspora -2.571 -2.645 -3.599 
Source specific factors Si, t-1 
Education level (ISCED) in    3.579 1.001 -4.271 
      source cohort -3.416 -7.327 -5.739 
Proportion of employed in -5.603 -19.142* -17.305** 
      source cohort -8.846 -10.111 -8.650 
Interaction: push-pull factors and migration regime Iij,t-1
Net wage x regime dummy -3.479* 
-2.004 
Unemployment rate                 0.438** 
      x regime dummy -0.194 
Population in dest. country      -0.014 
      x regime dummy               -0.038 
Southern country                     -7.364*** 
      x regime dummy               -1.713 
Social expenditures to GDP    -5.147 






Table 6A:  Estimates for the static flow model with all covariates (continued) 
Diaspora stock in j in mio. -1.996 
      x regime dummy -4.239 
Education level in diaspora     -4.004 
      x regime dummy               -2.755 
Prop. of females in diaspora    0.175 
      x regime dummy        -4.943 
Prop. of employed in               2.108 
      diaspora x regime d.          -3.953 
Education level in source        4.416 
      cohort x regime dummy    -4.037 
Prop. of  employed in  -5.890 
      source x regime dummy -16.186 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Age and source dummies yes yes yes no no 
Source cohort dummies no no no yes yes 
Constant included                    yes yes yes yes yes 
R-squared                                0.286 0.298 0.315 0.338 0.474 
Number of observations          432 432 432 432 432 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors that are clustered by destination country and time are shown in 
parentheses. I use the STATA routine by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) to control for two-way clustered 
error terms. In all regressions, time dummies and a constant are included. All explanatory variables are lagged by 
one year except for the regime dummy. 
 
Table 7A:  Estimates for the static flow model with all covariates (minimum of 10 obs. per cohort) 
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Δmij,t = annual change in the diaspora ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Destination country variables Dj,t-1 
Net wage in 10,000 in j           1.219*** 1.307*** 1.465*** 1.453*** 1.518 
 (0.354) (0.431) (0.452) (0.409) (0.998) 
Unemployment rate in j           -0.052 -0.079 -0.076 -0.075 -0.241 
 (0.040) (0.051) (0.065) (0.072) (0.153) 
Population in destination         0.017** 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.015 
      country j in mio.                (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) 
Southern country (0/1)     2.258*** 2.638*** 2.756*** 2.748*** 3.839*** 
 (0.476) (0.705) (0.788) (0.842) (1.362) 
Regime dummy (restricted  0.426 0.528 0.590 0.517 -8.060 
      freedom of m.) in j (0/1)    (0.605) (0.646) (0.673) (0.742) (8.270) 
Social expenditures          1.837 4.095 5.249 5.679 12.872 
      / GDP in j              (4.668) (5.091) (4.744) (4.951) (8.762) 
Source-destination (network) effects Nij,t-1 
Diaspora stock in j in mio. 1.314 1.035 1.083 4.173** 
 (0.884) (0.866) (0.878) (1.743) 
Education level (ISCED)  -0.479 -0.427 -0.744 
      in age-specific diaspora  (0.477) (0.416) (0.794) 
Proportion of females       -1.910 -1.977 -0.945 
      in age-specific diaspora (1.347) (1.507) (0.827) 
Proportion of employed 0.405 0.417 -0.042 
      in age-specific diaspora (0.743) (0.770) (1.274) 
Source specific factors Si, t-1 
Education level (ISCED) in    0.609 2.198 0.089 
      source cohort (1.953) (3.563) (3.538) 
Proportion of employed in -2.144 -6.461 -8.634*** 







Table 7A:  Estimates for the static flow model with all covariates (continued) 
Interaction: push-pull factors and migration regime Iij,t-1
Net wage x regime dummy -0.753 
(1.161) 
Unemployment rate                 0.333** 
      x regime dummy (0.169) 
Population in dest. country      -0.005 
      x regime dummy               (0.027) 
Southern country                     -3.566** 
      x regime dummy               (1.549) 
Social expenditures to GDP    -14.448 
      x regime dummy   (11.160) 
Diaspora stock in j in mio. -4.666** 
      x regime dummy (2.336) 
Education level in diaspora     0.281 
      x regime dummy               (0.906) 
Prop. of females in diaspora    -0.378 
      x regime dummy        (2.211) 
Prop. of employed in               0.599 
      diaspora x regime d.          (1.124) 
Education level in source        1.868 
      cohort x regime dummy    (2.222) 
Prop. of  employed in  -8.849 
      source x regime dummy (6.317) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Age and source dummies yes yes yes no no 
Source cohort dummies no no no yes yes 
Constant included                    yes yes yes yes yes 
R-squared                                0.206 0.229 0.239 0.244 0.375 
Number of observations          621 621 621 621 621 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors that are clustered by destination country and time are shown in 
parentheses. I use the STATA routine by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) to control for two-way clustered 
error terms. In all regressions, time dummies and a constant are included. All explanatory variables are lagged by 
one year except for the regime dummy. 
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